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In recent years, Delaware has served as the hot bed for the dramatic increase in merger ap-
praisal litigation and the proliferation of “appraisal arbitrage” whereby opportunistic shareholders
buy into companies following merger announcements and challenge announced deal prices as an
investment strategy. While this has not always proved profitable, it has increased scrutiny over the
Delaware appraisal regime and the ability for shareholders to avail themselves of the opportunity
for a judicial valuation of their shares. Furthermore, it has highlighted information asymmetries in
which controlling shareholders, particularly those seeking to cash out their minority shareholders,
are incentivized to underpay or mislead minority shareholders who might be reluctant to seek ap-
praisal. This raises questions regarding the accessibility of the appraisal remedy and how closely
appraisal should mirror class actions which allow for broader representation with lower barri-
ers to entry. This Note argues that current trends in merger and appraisal litigation, particularly
those which have significantly heightened scrutiny over pre- and post-closing disclosure claims,
present an opportunity to reexamine quasi-appraisal as a collective form of redress in appraisal
actions. This Note calls for the expansion of the quasi-appraisal remedy to provide greater ac-
cess to appraisal valuations in the most extreme examples of minority shareholder manipulation,
which would provide a more equitable form of recovery and discourage manipulation of minority
shareholders.
KEYWORDS:Appraisal Litigation, Cash-Out Mergers, Mergers and Acquisitions, Fiduciary Du-
ties, Duty of Disclosure, Corporate Governance, Merger Litigation
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In recent years, Delaware has served as the hot bed for the dramatic
increase in merger appraisal litigation and the proliferation of
“appraisal arbitrage” whereby opportunistic shareholders buy into
companies following merger announcements and challenge
announced deal prices as an investment strategy. While this has not
always proved profitable, it has increased scrutiny over the Delaware
appraisal regime and the ability for shareholders to avail themselves
of the opportunity for a judicial valuation of their shares. Furthermore,
it has highlighted information asymmetries in which controlling
shareholders, particularly those seeking to cash out their minority
shareholders, are incentivized to underpay or mislead minority
shareholders who might be reluctant to seek appraisal. This raises
questions regarding the accessibility of the appraisal remedy and how
closely appraisal should mirror class actions which allow for broader
representation with lower barriers to entry. This Note argues that
current trends in merger and appraisal litigation, particularly those
which have significantly heightened scrutiny over pre- and post-
closing disclosure claims, present an opportunity to reexamine quasi-
appraisal as a collective form of redress in appraisal actions. This Note
calls for the expansion of the quasi-appraisal remedy to provide
greater access to appraisal valuations in the most extreme examples of
minority shareholder manipulation, which would provide a more
equitable form of recovery and discourage manipulation of minority
shareholders.
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INTRODUCTION
Sherry Shareholder owns a 2% stake in Controlled Corporation
(CC), a Delaware corporation controlled by Matt Majority, who owns a
90% stake. CC is publicly traded and its stock is currently estimated to be
worth $10 per share after being worth $20 six months earlier. Majority
decides to take the company private by acquiring all of its publicly
available shares to capitalize on the current low stock price and reinvest
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in the corporation to maximize its efficiency and capacity for profits.1 To
do this Majority undergoes a “cash-out merger”2 under Section 253 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). Shareholder is paid $12 per
share, a 20% premium, but because her shares were worth $20 just six
months earlier, she believes this price unfairly denies her the adequate
value of her 2% stake. Does she have a remedy?
The answer depends on the disclosure process and CC’s efforts to
inform Shareholder of her shares’ value. While appraisal is deemed the
exclusive remedy for disgruntled shareholders,3 it does not account for
fraudulent or illegal behavior on behalf of the controlling shareholder or
material omissions or misstatements that may significantly impact
Shareholder’s knowledge of the “fair value”4 of her shares.5 Is this
1. This assumes that once private, CC will not issue dividends and Majority will
focus on increasing the company’s profitability by increasing capital expenditures to
improve and expand operations.
2. For purposes of this Note, a “cash-out merger” is a merger whereby a target
company is merged into an acquiring company, and the shareholders of the target
company are provided with cash as compensation for relinquishing their shares.
3. Appraisal is a statutorily mandated procedure whereby target shareholders who
object to the merger price may seek an independent judicial valuation of their shares in a
proceeding in a state court of the corporation’s state of incorporation. This Note limits its
discussion of appraisal to Delaware and proceedings brought before the Delaware Court
of Chancery, the state’s trial court known for its expertise in commercial litigation.
Delaware allows minority shareholders to seek appraisal subject to certain exceptions and
procedural requirements. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2016). For a discussion of
these exceptions and procedural requirements, see infra Part I.A.
4. Delaware courts must assess “all relevant factors” when determining the fair
value of shares. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (West 2016). Fair value is a highly
contested factor in appraisal proceedings and Delaware courts have “significant
discretion” to determine the fair value of shares. Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP,
11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010). The Delaware Supreme Court has recently clarified
that fair value is “fair compensation for [a petitioner’s] shares in the sense that it reflects
what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-
length transaction.” DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., No. 518, 2016,
2017 WL 3261190, at *18 (Del. Aug. 1, 2017).
5. It is generally understood that shareholders who own more than 50% of the
company’s stock or demonstrate “domination by a minority shareholder through actual
control of corporate conduct,” are controlling shareholders. Citron v. Fairchild Camera
& Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 70 (Del. 1989) (citations omitted); see also Kahn v.
Lynch Commc’n Sys., 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (finding that a 44% shareholder should
be treated as a controlling shareholder based on its ability to control corporate decisions).
Controlling shareholders owe fiduciary duties both to the corporation and its minority
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equitable to Shareholder? How may she recover the fair value of her
shares with limited knowledge of how CC determined the merger or deal
price? The answer may not lie within statutory appraisal relief but instead
may hinge on a rarely invoked post-closing damages remedy known as
quasi-appraisal.6
Based on the Delaware Court of Chancery’s “fair value”
determination,7 quasi-appraisal damages attempt to compensate minority
shareholders for the out-of-pocket damages they suffered following the
loss of their shares and the breach of a controlling shareholder’s duty of
disclosure.8 Quasi-appraisal damages attempt to rectify inadequate
disclosure and an ill-informed decision regarding the exercise of
discretionary appraisal rights by allowing plaintiffs post-closing claims
when they would otherwise not qualify for the statutory appraisal
remedy.9 However, this remedy is only available if the Court of Chancery
determines that a controlling shareholder breached its duty of disclosure
and that the breach contributed to a finding that the short-form merger,
whereby a 90%+ shareholder acquires the corporation’s remaining shares
without a minority shareholder vote, cashed out the minority shareholders
without properly informing minority shareholders of their appraisal
rights.10 The quasi-appraisal calculation is based on the difference
shareholders (those holding less than the controlling stake) to prevent actions that benefit
controlling shareholders to the detriment of the corporation and its minority shareholders.
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
6. Quasi-appraisal is a class-wide equitable remedy to assess the out-of-pocket
damages suffered by minority shareholders which compensates them for the loss of their
shares following the breach of a controlling shareholder’s duty of disclosure. See
generally In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 50 (Del. Ch. 2014).
For a discussion of quasi-appraisal, see infra Part III.
7. See supra note 4.
8. See supra note 6.
9. See generally Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 136–45 (Del. 2009).
10. The duty of disclosure or ‘duty of candor’ requires directors and controlling
shareholders to “disclose fully and fairly all material information within the board’s
control when it seeks shareholder action.”Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998)
(quoting Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1056 (Del. 1996) (quoting Stroud v. Grace,
606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992))). The requirement to disclose all material information is not
an independent duty “but the application in a specific context of the board’s fiduciary
duties of care, good faith, and loyalty.”Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1086 (Del.
2001). Short-form mergers under DGCL Section 253 are not subjected to entire fairness
review; instead, “absent fraud or illegality, the only recourse for a minority stockholder
who is dissatisfied with the merger consideration is appraisal.”Glassman v. Unocal Expl.
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between the merger consideration provided and the fair value of minority
shareholders’ shares.11
Understanding Delaware courts’ use of quasi-appraisal requires an
overview of several related areas. This Note proceeds as follows. Part I
briefly examines the statutory framework for minority shareholders’
rights following “cash-out” mergers under the DGCL. Part II discusses
current trends in merger litigation that negatively impact minority
shareholders’ ability to seek appraisal or recover post-closing damages.12
Part III discusses the history and application of quasi-appraisal as an
equitable remedy.13 Finally, Part IV recommends means of reform,
through an expansion of the quasi-appraisal remedy to ensure that
minority shareholders are adequately protected following DGCL Section
253 mergers.
I. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
This Part discusses the statutory framework for the quasi-appraisal
remedy, namely, the statutory availability of appraisal in Delaware under
DGCL Section 262 and the statutory authority for short-form mergers
under DGCL Section 253 when a controlling shareholder owns at least
ninety percent of a company in a “cash-out” or “going-private” merger.
Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 (Del. 2001). However, “[a]lthough fiduciaries are not required
to establish entire fairness in a short-form merger, the duty of full disclosure remains, in
the context of this request for stockholder action.” Id. at 248.
11. See Berger, 976 A.2d at 137 (discussing Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No.
13618, 1995 WL 405750, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 5, 1995)).
12. For purposes of this Note, post-closing damages are damages which are available
to wronged plaintiffs following the consummation of a merger transaction. Short-form
mergers under DGCL Section 253 are said to have closed immediately after the parent
corporation through the expedited process of filing a certificate of ownership and merger.
See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247 (discussing DGCL Section 253).
13. For purposes of this Note, an equitable remedy is a judicially-crafted remedy
which is obtained when available legal remedies cannot redress the injury to a non-
breaching party following breaches of contract. See Equitable Remedy, BLACK’S LAW.
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). In this context, it arises as a way in which the Delaware
Court of Chancery may craft remedies that provide recoveries to minority shareholders
outside of the statutory appraisal process following breaches of the duty of disclosure.
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A. SECTION 262: THE STATUTORYAPPRAISAL REMEDY
Section 262 of the DGCL permits stockholders of corporations
acquired in certain merger or consolidation transactions to exercise
appraisal rights, subject to certain exceptions and procedural
requirements.14 DGCL Section 262(g), recently amended by House Bill
371 and applicable to transactions consummated, resolutions adopted and
authorizations provided on or after August 1, 2016,15 provides that the
Court of Chancery must dismiss an appraisal proceeding as to all
stockholders who assert appraisal rights unless:
(1) the total number of shares entitled to appraisal exceeds 1% of the
outstanding shares of the class or series eligible for appraisal, (2) the
value of the consideration provided in the merger or consolidation for
such total number of shares exceeds $1 million, or (3) the merger was
approved pursuant to § 253 or § 267 [of the DGCL].16
Recent amendments limit appraisal demands by including a new de
minimis exception that restricts appraisal demands where the number or
value of shareholders’ shares is minimal.17 However, for this de minimis
exception to apply, the shares at issue must be listed on a national
securities exchange immediately before the merger or consolidation.18
14. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 262 (West 2016).
15. Act of June 16, 2016, ch. 265, § 10, 80 Del. Laws (2015–2016) (codified at DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(g) (West 2016)). The bill became effective on August 1, 2016
and applies only to appraisal proceedings arising out of (i) “transactions consummated
pursuant to agreements entered into on or after August 1, 2016,” (ii) “mergers pursuant
to Section 253 [of the DGCL with] resolutions adopted by [a] board of directors on or
after August 1, 2016 or,” (iii) “mergers pursuant to Section 267 [of the DGCL],
authorizations provided on or after August 1, 2016.” Id. § 18 (emphasis added).
16. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 262(g) (West 2016).
17. Id.; Appraisal demands are formal letters written by dissenting shareholders
which are “deliver[ed] to the corporation, before the taking of the vote on the merger or
consolidation,” and “reasonably inform[] the corporation of the identity of the
stockholder and that the stockholder intends thereby to demand the appraisal of such
stockholder’s shares.” Id. § 262(d)(1).
18. The so called “market out” exception states that “no appraisal rights under this
section shall be available for the shares of any class or series of stock, which stock, or
depository receipts in respect thereof, at the record date fixed to determine the
stockholders entitled to receive notice of and to vote at the meeting of stockholders to act
upon the agreement of merger or consolidation, were . . . listed on a national securities
exchange.” Id. § 262(b)(1).
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Appraisal awards have a default presumption of accruing interest at
a rate of five percent over the Federal Reserve discount rate from the
merger’s effective date through the actual payment of the appraisal award,
and are compounded quarterly unless the Court of Chancery determines
otherwise for good cause.19 Corporations can settle claims with appraisal
petitioners prior to the appraisal proceedings.20
However, amendments to DGCL Section 262(h) prevent statutory
interest from running on the entire amount of damages sought. For
example, if a corporation makes a voluntary cash payment to the appraisal
petitioners for all or a portion of the merger consideration, then recovery
on interest is limited to the difference between the prepaid amount and
the final award.21 Pursuant to DGCL Section 262(h), these agreements
permit the corporation to prepay a portion of the merger consideration and
avoid accruing a portion of the statutory interest prior to the Court of
Chancery’s determination of fair value.22 Any prepayment is at the sole
discretion of the corporation and does not influence the Court of
19. Id. § 262(h). While it is unclear how Delaware courts will interpret what
constitutes “good cause,” some commentators have noted that a “bylaw precluding
statutory interest for appraisal arbitrageurs, who did not own their stock prior to the
announcement of the merger agreement and who acquired their stock notwithstanding
notice of the bylaw” would arguably be “good cause.” Berton W. Ashman et al.,
Appraisal Practice Tips 1 Year After Prepayment Amendment, POTTER ANDERSON &
CORROONLLP (July 31, 2017), http://www.potteranderson.com/newsroom-publications-
Appraisal-Practice-Tips-1-Year-After-Prepayment-Amendment.html
[https://perma.cc/4QVT-BRGA].
20. Some commentators have noted that the costs of appraisal litigation are so
expensive that in many instances they induce settlement. See e.g., Theodore E. Mirvis et
al., Delaware Appraisal at a Crossroads?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE&
FIN. REG. (June 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/20/delaware-
appraisal-at-a-crossroads/ [https://perma.cc/P83C-WVWC] (noting that recent appraisal
litigation has raised fundamental questions regarding structuring appraisal in ways that
would reduce settlement).
21. DGCL Section 262(h) provides that “the surviving corporation may pay to each
stockholder entitled to appraisal an amount in cash, in which case interest shall accrue
thereafter as provided [t]herein only upon the sum of (1) the difference, if any, between
the amount so paid and the fair value of the shares as determined by the Court, and (2)
interest theretofore accrued, unless paid at that time.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)
(West 2016).
22. Id.
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Chancery’s determination of fair value.23 Some commentators note that
these legislative amendments may prevent appraisal arbitrage,24 and
provide less incentive for shareholders to bring appraisal actions.25
B. SECTION 253: THE STATUTORY SHORT-FORMMERGER
DGCL Section 253 allows for short-form mergers in which a
Delaware parent corporation that owns “at least 90% of the outstanding
shares of each class of the stock of a [subsidiary] corporation” can
authorize the buy-out of the minority shareholders without a shareholder
vote.26 DGCL Section 253 streamlines the process and does not require a
parent or subsidiary shareholder vote, but requires that minority
shareholders receive cash, stock, debt, or other securities in return for
their shares.27
23. Id.; see also Ashman et al. supra note 19 (noting that “[w]hile no legal inference
may be drawn from the prepayment as to whether the amount prepaid represents the fair
value of the appraised shares, prepayment may affect the litigation in other ways”).
24. “‘[A]ppraisal arbitrage’ [is] a practice whereby institutional investors invest in a
company upon a takeover announcement with the intention of exercising appraisal rights.
. . . [to] take advantage of the relatively high default interest rate under the [DGCL] (5%
over the Federal Reserve discount rate) earned on the value of shares held by dissenting
stockholders pending disposition of an appraisal claim and payable even if the final
appraisal award is less than the merger consideration paid to non-dissenting
stockholders.” Oliver Brahmst & Matthew Hendy, Appraisal Risk Back in the Spotlight
After Dell, WHITE&CASELLP (June 6, 2016), https://www.whitecase.com/publications/
alert/appraisal-risk-back-spotlight-after-dell [https://perma.cc/24UJ-V7K5].
25. Should corporations prepay appraisal amounts, they may limit investors who
seek or prolong appraisal solely for the purpose of accruing the statutorily mandated
interest rate as an investment strategy in a near-zero interest economy. Amendments to
Delaware General Corporation Law Will Affect Appraisal Actions and “Intermediate-
Form”Mergers, ROPES&GRAYLLP (June 20, 2016), https://www.ropesgray.com/news
room/alerts/2016/June/Amendments-to-Delaware-General-Corporation-Law-Will-Affe
ct-Appraisal-Actions.aspx [https://perma.cc/4DQM-7HFD]; but see Ashman et al. supra
note 19 (“For serial acquirers, prepayment could come with the risk that the money will
be used to fund an arbitrage investment in the next target of the acquirer, leading to yet
more appraisal litigation.”).
26. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (West 2017).
27. Id.
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Shareholders of the parent corporation who dissent from the merger
are not entitled to statutory appraisal remedies.28 However, to ensure that
they receive the fair value of their shares, dissenting minority
shareholders of a subsidiary company can seek appraisal pursuant to
DGCL Section 262.29 In fact, the Delaware Supreme Court established
that “absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive remedy available
to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger” and that
“[t]he determination of fair value must be based on all relevant factors,
including damages and elements of future value, where appropriate.”30
This exception from entire fairness review31 is based on the notion that if
“the corporate fiduciary sets up negotiating committees, hires
independent financial and legal experts, etc., then it will have lost the very
benefit provided by the statute—a simple, fast and inexpensive process
for accomplishing a merger.”32 That being said, the controlling
shareholder is only entitled to this form of “limited review” and
“exclusive remedy” when “all facts are disclosed that would enable the
shareholders to decide whether to accept the merger price or seek
appraisal.”33 Since these protections are available to parent corporations
conducting DGCL Section 253 mergers, they are an incentive to provide
proper disclosure when cashing out minority shareholders.
28. Id. § 253(d) (in the event of a short-formmerger involving a Delaware subsidiary
not 100% owned by the parent, the stockholders of the Delaware subsidiary shall have
appraisal rights as set forth in § 262). In this context, dissenting from the merger involves
shareholders of the acquiring company voting against the merger at issue.
29. These appraisal rights are available if “all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware
corporation party to a merger effected under § 251(h), § 253 or § 267 . . . is not owned
by the parent [corporation] immediately prior to the merger.” Id. § 262.
30. Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001).
31. Entire fairness review is a heightened form of judicial scrutiny applied to
transactions where a majority of the board of directors appear interested. In re KKR Fin.
Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 990 (Del. Ch. 2014). In those instances, the
transaction must be inherently and objectively fair, both in terms of a fair dealing and a
fair price. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
32. Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247–48.
33. Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 134 (Del. 2009) (discussing Glassman,
777 A.2d at 248).
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II. CURRENTTRENDS INMERGER ANDAPPRAISALLITIGATION
Significant attention has been drawn to current trends in merger
litigation whereby nearly 95% of publicly announced mergers have been
challenged in one or more jurisdictions.34 These lawsuits (often class-
action suits) are characterized as frivolous, and have amounted to a trend
of “ritualized quasi-litigation” where the plaintiffs’ bar brings
unmeritorious claims and then grants broad releases of their claims in
exchange for supplemental disclosure and attorney’s fees.35 These broad
settlements are appropriately named “disclosure-only settlements.”36 This
practice is seen as rising to a level of a “deal tax” on mergers that leads to
what current Chief Justice Leo E. Strine Jr. of the Delaware Supreme
Court characterized as “intergalactic releases” of shareholder claims.37
These claims often lead to nothing more than supplemental disclosure and
attorney’s fees and have likely prevented meritorious claims from
receiving the appropriate attention that they deserve.
This Part discusses additional trends in merger litigation that affect
plaintiff’s ability to recover in: (1) disclosure-only settlements, (2)
transactions involving uncoerced and fully informed shareholder votes,
(3) post-closing damages actions, (4) transactions involving a controlling
shareholder conditioned on protections provided ab initio, and (5) based
on “fair value” determinations in statutory appraisal proceedings under
DGCL Section 262(h). These trends establish a framework to better
understand quasi-appraisal jurisprudence in Delaware and efforts to
ensure that controlling shareholders adhere to their duty of disclosure and
34. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014 2
(Feb. 20, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902 [https://pe
rma.cc/6PHU-GKEM].
35. In reActivision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1067 (Del. Ch.
2015).
36. Id.
37. See Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Request for Attorneys’ Fees and the
Court’s Rulings at 65, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 7930–VCL (Del. Ch.
July 8, 2015). In Acevedo, Chief Justice Strine rejected a global release of claims in
exchange for a reduced termination fee and a shortening of the matching-rights period by
one day because the deal protections had not impeded competing bidders and thus were
insufficient to support a global release. Id. at 71–73. Further, the additional disclosures
were nonsubstantive, immaterial, and insufficient consideration to support the broad
“intergalactic release.” Id. at 73.
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provide sufficient information for minority shareholders to assess the fair
value of their shares.
A. INCREASED SCRUTINY OFDISCLOSUREONLY SETTLEMENTS
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigationmarked an abrupt shift in the
landscape of merger litigation in Delaware by signaling increased
skepticism of disclosure-only settlements.38 In Trulia, Chancellor
Bouchard rejected a disclosure-only settlement as inadequate, finding that
supplemental disclosures were not “plainly material” and therefore
insufficient to support the broad release of stockholder claims against the
defendants.39 In doing so, the Court of Chancery articulated a new
standard to support heightened judicial scrutiny of disclosure-only
settlements. That is, supplemental disclosures must be “plainly material”
in a way that “significantly alter[s] the ‘total mix’ of information made
available” to shareholders to address a material misrepresentation or
omission at early stages of litigation.40 However, wary that the plaintiffs’
bar would seek disclosure-only settlements in other jurisdictions, the
court stated that the proliferation of forum-selection clauses could be
combined with the “hope and trust” that other courts would adopt a
similar approach to disclosure-only settlements.41 Some commentators
speculate that Trulia could increase merger litigation,42 but early
indications suggest that Delaware’s heightened standard and attempts to
limit frivolous litigation and alleviate the “deal tax” have been partially
successful in reducing merger litigation.43
B. THE “CLEANSING” EFFECT OFCORWIN
Around the same time as Trulia, Delaware courts began to articulate
a heightened standard for post-closing damages claims by limiting
38. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
39. Id. at 898–99.
40. Id. at 896 (quoting Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 710 (Del. 2009)).
41. Id. at 899.
42. See Paul J. Collins & Michael J. Kahn, Deal Litigation After Trulia, DEL. BUS.
CT. INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.delbizcourt.com/id=1202756113215 [https://pe
rma.cc/8A9H-LKAU].
43. See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, VAND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
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damages available from an alleged breach of fiduciary duty by target
company directors following certain merger transactions.44 This created a
“cleansing effect” whereby mergers approved by informed and
disinterested shareholders and not otherwise subject to entire fairness
review could overcome certain breaches of fiduciary duties and
extinguish post-closing damages claims at the motion to dismiss phase.45
Furthermore, the Delaware Supreme Court held in Corwin v. KKR
Financial Holdings, that the business judgment rule is the appropriate
standard of review if a deal is (1) “approved by the fully informed,
uncoerced majority of disinterested stockholders” and (2) “not subject to
the entire fairness” standard of review.46 Shortly after Corwin, the
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the business judgment rule in light of
proper shareholder approval and emphasized that:
[w]hen the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked
because of a vote, dismissal is typically the result. That is because the
vestigial waste exception has long had little real-world relevance,
[and] because it has been understood that stockholders would be
unlikely to approve a transaction that is wasteful.47
44. See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015).
45. See Joseph O. Larkin & Shaivlini Khemka, After Corwin, Court of Chancery
Provides Additional Guidance on Application of Business Judgment Rule to Post-Closing
Damages Claims, INSIGHTS: DEL. EDITION (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/
insights/after-corwin-court-chancery-provides-additional-guidance-application-business
-judgment-rule. For purposes of this Note, a disinterested shareholder is one who is not a
controlling shareholder an insider of the corporation, or otherwise standing on both sides
of the transaction. The underlying logic assumes that the informed and uncoerced vote of
disinterested shareholders is able to otherwise overcome certain breaches of fiduciary
duties.
46. Corwin, 125 A.3d at 305–06. The business judgment rule is a deferential form
of judicial review that relies upon the “presumption that in making a business decision
the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.” Aronson v. Lewis,
473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d
244 (Del. 2000). If the business judgment rule applies, Delaware courts “will not
substitute [their] own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.” Sinclair Oil
Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
47. Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (citations omitted).
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Thus, Corwin and its progeny further emphasize the importance of
shareholder approval to “cleanse” transactions, and Delaware courts’
skeptical view of post-closing damages claims.
Furthermore, the cleansing effect of a fully informed shareholder
vote has been extended to post-closing damages claims following
noncoercive first-step tender offers and transactions that do not involve a
controlling shareholder.48 For example, the Court of Chancery found that
shareholders’ decisions to participate in tender offers has “the same
cleansing effect” under Corwin as stockholder approval pursuant to a
traditional long-form merger.49 Therefore, Vice Chancellor Tamika
Montgomery-Reeves rejected the arguments that (1) tender offers differ
from “statutorily required stockholder votes based on the lack of any
explicit role in the [DGCL] for a target board of directors responding to a
tender offer,” and (2) “a first-step tender offer in a two-step merger
arguably is more coercive than a stockholder vote in a one-step merger.”50
In Larkin v. Shah, the Court of Chancery stated that the entire fairness
standard only applies in the controlling shareholder context because those
cases involve “inherent coercion”51 and that the business judgment rule is
the “irrebuttable” standard absent a controlling shareholder’s
48. See, e.g., In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 741 (Del. Ch.
2016), aff’d, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017) (unpublished table decision). In this context, a
noncoercive tender offer is a controlling shareholder’s public offer to purchase securities
for consideration where shareholders are not “wrongfully induced by some act of the
defendants to sell their shares for reasons unrelated to the economic merits of the sale.”
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 533 A.2d 585, 605 (Del. Ch. 1987), aff’d,
535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987).
49. Volcano, 143 A.3d at 741. For purposes of this Note, a long-form merger is a
merger by a shareholder who owns less than 90% of the target company’s shares and who
must receive approval of the merger in the form of a target shareholder vote. See DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (West 2017).
50. Volcano, 143 A.3d at 742–43 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
51. See In re JCC Holding Co., 843 A.2d 713, 723 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“[C]ontrolling
stockholders are reasonably perceived as having such potent retributive powers as to
subject minority stockholders to inherent coercion in casting a vote on a squeeze-out
merger. This inherent coercion is thought to undermine the fairness-guaranteeing effect
of a majority-of-the-minority vote condition because coerced fear or a hopeless
acceptance of a dominant power’s will, rather than rational self-interest, is deemed likely
to be the animating force behind the minority’s decision to approve the merger.”
(applying Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1116–17 (Del. 1994))).
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involvement in a conflicted transaction.52 These cases reaffirm that
Delaware courts continue to trust the collective wisdom of shareholders
and their voting approval to cleanse the majority of non-conflicted
transactions.
C. A “BRAVENEWWORLD” FOR POST-CLOSINGDAMAGESCLAIMS
These trends reflect Delaware courts’ continued skepticism
regarding the merits of post-closing claims, and the increased deference
courts grant corporations that adhere to uncoerced and informed
shareholder votes. Due to these shifts in merger litigation, plaintiffs find
it increasingly difficult to bring post-closing damages claims.53
Furthermore, the permissible window of time to bring post-closing
disclosure claims is shorter.54 This is likely a result ofCorwin and Trulia’s
combined effects which—given the number of suits resulting in mootness
settlements and the deference granted to shareholder votes—decreased
defendants’ willingness to voluntarily produce discovery on disclosure
and other pre-closing claims.55 Confronted by these conditions, plaintiffs
allege they face a “brave new world” for post-closing damages claims,
and challenge limited production on the grounds that “plaintiffs cannot
fairly assess whether a disclosure violation occurred, rendering the vote
‘uninformed’ for Corwin purposes.”56 For instance, the plaintiffs in In re
Columbia Pipeline Group, Inc. Stockholder Litigation, sought a rule
denying the defendant corporation’s motion to dismiss, staying discovery,
and requiring the defendant to produce discovery documents that could
52. Larkin v. Shah, C.A. No. 10918–VCS, 2016 WL 4485447, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug.
25, 2016).
53. See Larkin & Khemka, supra note 45 (“As a practical matter, the Corwin case
has created a high bar for plaintiff stockholders to pursue a post-closing damages
claim.”).
54. Id. (“[Recent decisions] strongly indicate that disclosure claims should be
brought before the stockholder vote when the purported harm of an uninformed vote may
still be remedied. Accordingly, stockholder plaintiffs may not be able to seek tactical gain
by deferring disclosure claims until after stockholders vote and the disclosures can no
longer be supplemented.”).
55. See id.; see also Edward B. Micheletti et al., Forward Momentum: Trulia
Continues to Impact Resolution of Deal Litigation in Delaware and Beyond, INSIGHTS:
DEL. EDITION (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/11/
forward-momentum-itruliai-continues-to-impact-reso.
56. SeeMicheletti et al., supra note 55.
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enable plaintiffs to determine whether a material omission occurred for
purposes of a duty of disclosure violation.57 The omission at issue related
to the plaintiffs’ contention that Columbia Pipeline Group’s directors
engineered a spin-off and sold the company to TransCanada Corporation
to secure change-in-control bonuses for themselves.58 In a bench ruling,
Vice Chancellor Laster rejected these claims because the plaintiffs bore
the burden to plead sufficient facts making it reasonably conceivable that
any duty of disclosure violations occurred and that Corwin did not
apply.59
While recently the Court of Chancery found that certain disclosure
claims can proceed following a shareholder vote that was neither
uncoerced nor uninformed, for purposes of Corwin, the unique facts at
issue likely indicate the extreme circumstances necessary for post-closing
damages claims to overcome a motion to dismiss. In In re Saba Software,
Inc. Stockholder Litigation, Vice Chancellor Joseph Slights III denied
defendant corporation Saba’s motion to dismiss after a rushed sales
process where plaintiffs were forced to make a “Hobson’s choice”60 of
accepting nine dollars in cash or the “recently-deregistered, illiquid stock”
when voting on the merger.61 Finding a “pleading-stage inference of bad
faith,”62 Vice Chancellor Sights agreed that the plaintiffs could plead that
Saba acted in bad faith after providing limited financial projections and
that they failed to provide information sufficient for shareholders to assess
alternatives to the merger consideration.63 Because these issues occurred
in the midst of an accounting restatement that led to the company’s
deregistration by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
clear loyalty issues regarding the board’s incentive to capitalize on its
57. In re Columbia Pipeline Grp., Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 12152–VCL, 2017
WL 898382, at *1–3 (Del. Ch. Mar. 7, 2017).
58. Id. at *2.
59. See id. at *1, *5. The court noted that “[t]he duty of disclosure demands that
fiduciaries disclose facts. It does not demand that fiduciaries ‘engage in “self-
flagellation” and draw legal conclusions’ as to the inferences to be drawn from those
facts.” Id. at *3 (citation omitted).
60. In re Saba Software, Inc. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 10697–VCS, 2017 WL
1201108, at *15 (Del. Ch. Mar. 31, 2017).
61. Id.
62. Id. at *20.
63. See id. at *17, *20, *23 (discussing how plaintiffs successfully pled non-
exculpated breaches of the duties of care and loyalty).
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equity options,64 the rushed sales process, serious omissions, and clear
loyalty issues emphasized the extreme factors needed to amount to
materiality.65 Although the claims could proceed, this case likely reflects
the limits ofCorwin cleansing and the unlikely scenario that plaintiffs will
overcome following immaterial omissions.66
These challenges reflect judicial reluctance to permit post-closing
damages claims and emphasize the rarity of well-pled plaintiffs’
disclosure claims. Especially when corporations can provide limited
voluntary disclosure and rely upon the protections of the business
judgment rule at the pleadings stage. While not insurmountable, Corwin’s
cleansing remains a serious hurdle for plaintiffs seeking to recover post-
closing damages on disclosure claims.
D. CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS AND THEMFW STANDARD
Furthermore, these trends are not unique to the non-controller
context and are also prevalent in controlling shareholder “going private”
transactions. In fact, three recent opinions, In re Chelsea Therapeutics
International Ltd. Stockholders Litigation,67 In re Books-A-Million Inc.
Stockholders Litigation,68 and Employees Retirement System of St. Louis
64. See id. at *3, *21.
65. See e.g., S. Michael Sirkin & Nick Mozal, Saba Software Inc.—Eluding Corwin
Dismissal, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/05/saba-software-inc-eluding-corwin-dismissa
l/ [https://perma.cc/26FG-3AWK] (noting that while plaintiffs face a “steep uphill climb”
in overcoming the pleadings stages burden of overcoming Corwin and a non-exculpated
breach of fiduciary, Saba emphasizes that these burdens are “not insurmountable in the
right case”).
66. See Paul S. Scrivano & Sarah Young, Outer Boundaries of Corwin, and When a
Stockholder Vote Will Cleanse Post-Merger Claims, Are Taking Shape, ROPES&GRAY
LLP (May 1, 2017), https://www.ropesgray.com/newsroom/alerts/2017/05/Outer-Bound
aries-of-Corwin-and-When-a-Stockholder-Vote-will-Cleanse-Post-Merger-Claims.aspx
[https://perma.cc/5ZAS-3LC3] (discussing Saba, and the subsequent Court of Chancery
decision In re Paramount Gold and Silver Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 10499–
CB, 2017 WL 1372659 (Del. Ch. Apr. 13, 2017), which “should provide comfort that the
failure to include immaterial disclosure will not be usable by plaintiff stockholders as a
means to continue spurious claims beyond the motion to dismiss stage”).
67. In re Chelsea Therapeutics Int’l Ltd. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 9640–VCG,
2016 WL 3044721 (Del. Ch. May 20, 2016).
68. In re Books-A-Million Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 11343–VCL, 2016WL
5874974 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016).
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v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc.,69 reflect the Delaware courts’ adherence to the
“MFW standard” which applies the deferential business judgment rule at
the pleadings stage of controlling shareholder transactions and prevents
post-closing damages claims from proceeding to trial when certain
procedural requirements are met.70
In In re Chelsea Therapeutics, Vice Chancellor Sam Glasscock III
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims for post-closing damages alleging that
Chelsea Therapeutics’ board of directors acted in bad faith in selling the
company at a price substantially below its standalone value.71 The
plaintiffs originally sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the
transaction on the grounds that the defendants omitted certain projections
and study results in the proxy materials which were material to their
decision to vote on the merger.72 However, then Vice Chancellor Parsons
denied the motion on the grounds that the disclosure was sufficient and
that any additional studies were highly speculative.73 Following the denial
of the motion, the plaintiffs sought post-closing damages alleging that the
board’s decisions to disregard certain projections and to instruct its
financial advisor to ignore a set of financial projections when making a
fairness opinion led to the company’s undervaluation and were
“inconceivable as anything other than actions against the interests of the
stockholders, maximizing value for whom was, at that point, the only
proper purpose of the Board.”74 Since the case involved the denial of both
a pre-closing disclosure claim and post-closing damages claims, it further
69. Emps. Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc., No. 291, 2016, 2016 WL
7338592 (Del. Dec. 19, 2016).
70. The “MFW standard” refers to the six procedural requirements needed at the
outset of a transaction to invoke the business judgment rule for controlling shareholders:
“(i) the controller conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval of both a
special committee and a majority of the minority stockholders; (ii) the special committee
is independent; (iii) the special committee is empowered to freely select its own advisors
and to say no definitely; (iv) the special committee meets its duty of care; (v) the vote of
the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no coercion of the minority.” In re MFW
S’holders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 535 (Del. Ch. 2013). The MFW standard was adopted by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M &FWorldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 645 (Del.
2014).
71. See Chelsea Therapeutics, 2016 WL 3044721, at *1–2.
72. See id. at *4. The board had disclosed the existence of the alternative findings
and had stated that they were omitted because of their highly speculative nature. See id.
73. Id. at *4–5.
74. Id. at *2.
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demonstrates the difficult pleading requirements and the lack of remedies
available to challenging “take-private” transactions.
In re Books-A-Million and adherence to the MFW standard
emphasize the availability of the deferential business judgment rule
protection at the motion to dismiss stage of “take-private” transactions
involving controlling shareholders.75 The protection is available so long
as the defendants demonstrate their compliance with the MFW standard
“in a public way suitable for judicial notice, such as board resolutions and
a proxy statement” and further, the plaintiffs cannot plead with
sufficiency that any conditions of theMFW standard were not satisfied.76
In In re Books-A-Million, Vice Chancellor Laster confirmed that the Court
of Chancery would dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims at the
pleadings stages when all six procedural requirements of the MFW
standard were satisfied.77 Although the plaintiffs alleged that the MFW
standard should not apply because the special committee of independent
directors acted irrationally and in bad faith,78 Vice Chancellor Laster
disagreed, finding that the controlling shareholder, the Anderson family,
had no duty to facilitate a third-party offer and did not breach its fiduciary
duties by offering to buy the minority shares at a price lower than what a
third-party could have offered.79 For that reason, the Anderson family was
able to “freeze-out” the Books-A-Million minority without having to
overcome the entire fairness standard or the burden of discovery to prove
that the MFW standard was satisfied. In TC Pipelines, the Delaware
75. See e.g., Steven Epstein & Gail Weinstein, Books-A-Million Demonstrates the
Power of MFW, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE& FIN. REG. (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/17/books-a-million-demonstrates-the-power-
of-mfw/ [https://perma.cc/7U4L-W486] (emphasizing that “MFW and other decisions
reflect an evolution of the substantive law to much greater deference than in the past to
boards and stockholders in M&A matters”).
76. In re Books-A-Million, 2016 WL 5874974, at *8 (quoting Transcript of Oral
Argument on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the Court’s Ruling at 21, Swomley v.
Schlecht, No. 9355–VCL (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2014), 2014 WL 4470947).
77. See id. at *7–8.
78. The plaintiffs had sought enhanced scrutiny under Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc., for alleged violation of parts ii and iv of theMFW standard. See
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986).
79. In re Books-A-Million, 2016 WL 5874974, at *1, *12, *15.
2017] QUASI-APPRAISAL: APPRAISING BREACH 357
OF DUTY OF DISCLOSURE CLAIMS
Supreme Court confirmed that the Court of Chancery properly
determined adherence to theMFW standard at the pleadings stage.80
E. THEWEIGHTGRANTED TO THEDEAL PRICE IN SECTION 262 “FAIR
VALUE”DETERMINATIONS
Recent decisions by the Court of Chancery expound upon the relative
weight of the deal price in appraisal actions under DGCL Section 262(h).
These decisions emphasize the significant variations in appraisal
valuations based on differing valuation methods and unique case specific
factors. These decisions may signal a departure from the recent
proliferation of appraisal suits due to the inconsistency of approaches and
results.81 Continued deference to the deal price as a nearly-exclusive
indicator of fair value will likely continue to disincentivize minority
shareholders from seeking appraisal.
The Court of Chancery recently emphasized that it need not rely on
the merger price to assess fair value in management buyouts. For instance,
in In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., Vice Chancellor Laster determined that
Dell’s deal price was an unreliable measure of fair value, and the fair
value of Dell’s shares was twenty-eight percent higher than the deal price
provided.82 While commentators speculate that the case highlights a trend
in heightened appraisal exposure for management,83 Vice Chancellor
Laster noted that the transaction involved a management buyout,
rendering the deal price resulting from the public auction less relevant,
and that there was a significant “valuation gap” between the long-term
value of Dell and its short-termmarket value.84Although the management
buyout involved a well-run arms-length sales process, Laster found that
like-minded financial bidders made similar financial assumptions based
on required internal rates of return in leveraged buyout pricing models
80. Emps. Ret. Sys. of St. Louis v. TC Pipelines GP, Inc., No. 291, 2016, 2016 WL
7338592, at *2 n.9 (Del. Dec. 19, 2016) (citations omitted).
81. For a discussion of the substantial increase in appraisal proceedings, see Charles
R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company
M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1567–83 (2015).
82. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., C.A. No. 9322–VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at
*35–36 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
83. See e.g., Brahmst & Hendy, supra note 24.
84. In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *28–29, *32.
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which significantly undervalued Dell.85 While the Dell appraisal involved
unique facts, the case serves as a reminder of the significant challenge in
determining fair value and the difficulty in weighing various financial
theories and models in appraisal cases. As the case is currently pending
before the Delaware Supreme Court,86 the decision will likely be followed
closely as it could continue to incentivize appraisal arbitrage as an
investment strategy.
Difficult fair value assessments also arise in the context of
procedural deficiencies in sales involving controlling shareholders on
both sides of the transaction. For instance, Dunmire v. Farmers and
Merchants Bancorp of Western Pennsylvania Inc. involved a stock-for-
stock transaction between two controlling shareholders without a public
auction or outside bidders.87 Noting that the controlling shareholders on
both sides set the stock exchange ratio, Chancellor Bouchard “place[d] no
weight” on the merger price as an indicator of fair value,88 and conducted
a discounted net income analysis to set the share’s fair value at 10% above
the merger price.89 This case strongly emphasizes that judges may make
independent assessments of the share’s fair value based on their own
valuation methods, which may vary from the parties’ valuation methods.
Two Court of Chancery opinions from 2017, ACP Master, Ltd. v.
Sprint Corp. (Clearwire)90 and In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc.,91
further muddle fair value determinations and the appeal of seeking
appraisal. In fact, both cases found that minority shareholders’ shares
were worth materially less than the merger price. In Clearwire, hedge
85. See id. at *29–30.
86. For arguments pending before the Delaware Supreme Court, see Appellant’s
Opening Brief, Dell Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., No. 565,
2016 (Del. Jan. 17, 2017), 2017 WL 318529, and Appellee’s Opening Brief, Dell Inc. v.
Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., No. 565, 2016 (Del. Feb. 13, 2017),
2017 WL 825592.
87. Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchs. Bancorp of W. Pa., Inc., C.A. No. 10589–CB,
2016WL 6651411, at *1, *7 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016). For purposes of this Note, a stock-
for-stock transaction is a transaction whereby shares of the parent company’s stock are
provided as consideration to the target company in a merger transaction.
88. Id. at *7–8.
89. See id. at *1, *16.
90. ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp. (Clearwire), C.A. No. 8508–VCL, 2017 WL
3421142 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017).
91. In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., C.A. No. 10554–VCG, 2017 WL 2334852
(Del. Ch. May 30, 2017).
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fund Aurelius Capital Management sought a fair value determination of
$16.08 per share for its 25 million shares of Clearwire Corporation, which
Sprint, its 50.2% controlling shareholder, acquired in a take-private
transaction.92 Furthermore, Aurelius claimed that Sprint breached its
fiduciary duties as a controlling shareholder by forcing Clearwire to
accept its bid.93 Vice Chancellor Laster not only denied Aurelius’
valuation but also ruled that Sprint met its burden of demonstrating entire
fairness and overpaid for Clearwire following a highly contested bidding
war with DISH.94 Laster determined that Clearwire’s $3.6 billion sale
price ($5 per share) was more than twice its fair value of $2.03 per share
and maintained that “[t]he deal price also provided an exaggerated picture
of Clearwire’s value because the transaction generated considerable
synergies” with estimates ranging from $1.5 to $2 billion.95 In re
Appraisal of SWS also involved a “synergies-driven transaction”whereby
Hilltop Holdings, Inc. (Hilltop) acquired SWS Group Inc. (SWS) for a
mix of cash and stock worth $6.92 per share.96 Finding the merger price
to be unreliable, Vice Chancellor Glasscock relied on a “discounted cash
flow analysis” and determined that the consideration was worth $6.38 per
share, 7.8% below the merger consideration provided at closing.97
Interestingly, neither side argued that the deal price was the best indicator
of fair value and instead argued for traditional valuation methods that lead
to valuations “50% above and 50% below the deal price” respectively.98
While some note that the deal price is not the floor of fair value and that
“Delaware courts do not guarantee . . . positive . . . appraisal arbitrage[],”99
92. Clearwire, 2017 WL 3421142, at *1, *31.
93. Id. at *16.
94. Id. at *27.
95. Id. at *31. Interestingly, the court noted that had Clearwire accepted Sprint’s
earlier bid of $2.97 per share that the transaction likely would not have been entirely fair.
Instead, Sprint’s earlier “acts of unfair dealing would have resulted in a finding of
unfairness and a damages award in the form of a fairer price.” Id. at *20. However, after
shareholders voted down the $2.97 per share bid and DISH entered the bidding, the
merger price of $5 overcame any earlier unfair dealing. See id. at *26.
96. In re Appraisal of SWS Grp., Inc., 2017 WL 2334852, at *1, *5.
97. Id. at *1.
98. Id. The petitioner relied upon a comparable company’s analysis and both parties
conducted discounted cash flows analyses. Id. at *10.
99. Edward D. Herlihy et al., Delaware Court of Chancery Appraises Public
Company at Nearly 20% Below Merger Price, WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN&KATZ (May
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below-the-deal-price fair value determinations remain rare in appraisal
proceedings and may be limited to unique factual situations where it is
more difficult to assess fair value.100 However, Clearwire and In re
Appraisal of SWS may signal the potential for more fair value
determinations below the deal price, particularly in cases where the
merger price reflects significant synergies.
Nonetheless, the deal price remains an important consideration in
otherwise properly run sales processes without significant synergies. For
instance, in Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Services, Inc.,101
Chancellor Laster granted full weight to the deal price and emphasized
that if a:
merger giving rise to appraisal rights resulted from an arms-length
process between two independent parties, and if no structural
impediments existed that might materially distort the crucible of
objective market reality, then a reviewing court should give
substantial evidentiary weight to the merger price as an indicator of
fair value.102
Furthermore, the court focused on the pre-signing period and the
“market check” which in tandem with the merger price offered
meaningful competition in the absence of additional bidders.103 Thus, the
case reflects the deference the Court of Chancery provides to the deal
price in the event of a well-run sales process and absent noteworthy
unique facts that could affect a fair value determination.
The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent en banc reversal of a Court of
Chancery determination that the fair value of shares exceeded the deal
price reiterates the significant deference granted to the deal price in
31, 2017), http://static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20170601/swsappraisal—
wachtellmemo.pdf [https://perma.cc/96NQ-HVES].
100. See, e.g., Gail Weinstein & Philip Richter, Below-The-Merger-Price Appraisal
Results and the SWS Decision, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG.
(June 26, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/26/below-the-merger-price-
appraisal-results-and-the-sws-decision/#more-95410 [https://perma.cc/YFD6-L2SM]
(noting that there have only been two other below-the-merger-price determinations since
2010 and that the cases have all involved unusual facts).
101. Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., C.A. No. 9320–VCL,
2016 WL 7324170 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).
102. Id. at *14 (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted).
103. Id. at *21.
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appraisal proceedings with competitive sales processes. Additionally, it
demonstrates the rarity of favorable rulings for shareholders seeking
appraisal and the judicial deference granted to private equity buyers who
conduct market checks. In In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp.,104
private equity buyer, Lone Star, purchased payday lending company DFC
Global Corp. for around $9.50 per share, an amount that Chancellor
Bouchard found to be an undervaluation of nearly 8%.105 On appeal, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected Chancellor Bouchard’s equal weighing
of the deal price, a comparable company’s analysis, and discounted cash
flow projections in the wake of regulatory uncertainties undermining the
projections, and deferred to the deal price as the best indicator of fair
value.106 Writing that the purpose of an appraisal is to ensure that
shareholders “receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that
it reflects what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be
given to them in an arm’s-length transaction,”107 Chief Justice Strine
declined to adopt a presumption that the merger price unequivocally
demonstrates fair value, but stated that the Court of Chancery had a
proven record of determining that the deal price was the best indicator of
fair value and has significant discretion in fair value determinations based
on the facts at hand.108 Recognizing that the market of potential buyers
“who had money at stake” could properly account for the regulatory risks
necessary to value the company,109 Strine deferred to market-based
evidence of a fair sales process rather than the minority shareholders’
contentions that the company had been undervalued based on future
performance uncertainties and Lone Star’s financial constraints as a
financial buyer seeking an internal rate of return.110 The case reiterates the
difficulties minority shareholders face in appraisal proceedings and the
104. In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., C.A. No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123
(Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners,
L.P., No. 518, 2016, 2017 WL 3261190 (Del. Aug. 1, 2017) (en banc).
105. Id. at *1. Chancellor Bouchard had granted equal weight to a comparable
company’s analysis, the deal price and discounted cash flow projections to determine the
fair value of DFC’s shares. See id.
106. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., C.A. No. 518, 2016, 2017
WL 3261190, at *1 (Del. Aug. 1, 2017) (en banc).
107. Id. at *18.
108. Id. at *15.
109. Id. at *21.
110. Id. at *20.
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deference Delaware courts give to the deal price in properly run sales
processes. The Delaware Supreme Court may not have granted a
presumption in favor of the deal price, but reaffirmed that it will continue
to be viewed as the most reliable indicator of fair value.
III. QUASI-APPRAISAL
Quasi-appraisal has emerged as a means of measuring class-wide
recovery of out-of-pocket damages following a controlling shareholder’s
violation of its duty of disclosure.111 This Part discusses the history of the
remedy and its current use in short-form mergers where controlling
shareholders violate their duty of disclosure and misstate or deprive
minority shareholders of material information which could impact their
decision regarding whether to seek appraisal or accept the merger
consideration. Part III.A discusses the origins and development of quasi-
appraisal as an equitable remedy in Delaware. Part III.B discusses
Delaware’s tailoring of the quasi-appraisal remedy in a class-action
fashion and with risk factors like opting-in and escrow requirements for
plaintiffs seeking quasi-appraisal. Finally, Part III.C discusses quasi-
appraisal as an equitable remedy and not as an independent cause of
action, and the requirements plaintiffs must satisfy to avail themselves of
the remedy.
A. THEORIGINS OF POST-CLOSINGREMEDIES FORDUTY OFDISCLOSURE
VIOLATIONS
Quasi-appraisal was first introduced in Delaware in Weinberger v.
UOP, Inc., when created as an equitable remedy to temporarily allow
additional appraisal actions in response to significant adjustments to
Delaware law.112 Weinberger involved a “cash-out” merger where
minority shareholders of UOP Inc. (UOP) brought suit on behalf of a class
of shareholders who did not exchange their shares for the merger price
following a cash-out merger where the remaining shares of UOP were
acquired by its controlling shareholder, The Signal Companies, Inc.
111. See, e.g., In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch.
2014).
112. Weinberger v. UOP Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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(Signal).113 The plaintiffs also sought to set the merger aside or, in the
alternative, recover monetary damages against UOP, Signal, and Lehman
Brothers Kuhn Loeb, Inc., which served as UOP’s investment banker and
provided a fairness opinion prior to the merger.114 The plaintiffs did not
rely on the statutory appraisal remedies of DGCL Section 262, and yet the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the “Delaware block” method,115 and
allowed for additional appraisal actions to accommodate new “fair value”
valuation methods that were previously restricted.116 The court noted that
“[w]hile the present state of these proceedings does not admit the plaintiff
to the appraisal remedy per se, the practical effect of the remedy we do
grant him will be co-extensive with the liberalized valuation and appraisal
methods we herein approve for cases coming after this decision.”117 Thus,
Weinberger marks an abrupt change in merger law as the court promoted
appraisal to curb controlling shareholders’ exploitations of the minority
in cash-out mergers.118 For the first time, the court used its equitable
powers to artificially simulate an appraisal proceeding and fashioned a
remedy not previously available to plaintiffs. While Weinberger
emphasized the increased importance of appraisal to check majority
manipulation of the minority, the specific remedy of quasi-appraisal was
largely tailored to accommodate new valuation methods.
113. Id. at 703.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 712–13 (stating that the Delaware block method or weighted average
method “wherein the elements of value, i.e., assets, market price, earnings, etc., were
assigned a particular weight and the resulting amounts added to determine the value per
share. . . . shall no longer exclusively control such proceedings”).
116. Id. at 714 (citation omitted) (“On remand the plaintiff will be permitted to test
the fairness of the $21 price by the standards we herein establish, in conformity with the
principle applicable to an appraisal—that fair value be determined by taking ‘into account
all relevant factors.’ In our view this includes the elements of rescissory damages if the
Chancellor considers them susceptible of proof and a remedy appropriate to all the issues
of fairness before him.”).
117. Id. at 704.
118. See e.g., George S. Geis, An Appraisal Puzzle, 105 NW. L. REV. 1635, 1644
(2011) (footnotes omitted) (“Among other reforms, Weinberger established appraisal as
a primary legal framework for checking abusive freezeouts. It also replaced an overly
formalistic and outdated judicial valuation methodology with a more flexible and realistic
approach. These reforms, perhaps combined with an increase in freezeout mergers, soon
led to a new wave of appraisal proceedings.”).
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Following Weinberger, Delaware courts appeared reluctant to
invoke quasi-appraisal as an equitable remedy. Yet, Delaware courts
continued to clarify the duty of disclosure requirements necessary to
avoid quasi-appraisal proceedings. The Delaware Supreme Court noted
that when investors face an investment decision such as deciding whether
to seek appraisal, the “[t]he directors of a Delaware corporation are
required to disclose fully and fairly all material information within the
board’s control.”119 The materiality standard applies to information if
“there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote.”120 In the case of omitted
information, there must be “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as
having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
available.”121
Quasi-appraisal found new life in 1991 when the Court of Chancery
denied injunctions in In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co.
Shareholders Litigation122 and Steiner v. Sizzler Restaurants
International, Inc.123 but allowed plaintiffs in both cases to seek quasi-
appraisal. In both cases, quasi-appraisal was permitted due to the time
pressure of expediting decisions on the motions to enjoin the mergers and
the findings that neither instance involved material deficits in disclosure
which merited an injunction.124 However, Chancellor Allen noted in
Steiner that corrective disclosure, if provided prior to corporate action,
would be the preferred remedy to “counter-factual determinations (i.e.,
119. Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 12 (Del. 1998).
120. Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (quoting TSC
Industries, Inc. v. North-way, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
121. Id.
122. In re Ocean Drilling & Expl. Co. S’holders Litig., CIV. A. No. 11898, 1991 WL
70028 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1991).
123. Steiner v. Sizzler Rests. Int’l., Inc., C.A. No. 11994, 1991 WL 40872 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 19, 1991).
124. See, e.g., Robert B. Schumer et al., Quasi-Appraisal: The Unexplored Frontier
of Stockholder Litigation, 12 M&A J., no. 2, at 2. https://www.paulweiss.com/media/103
314/7719347_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4GF-FBDA] (“Each merger was a fait accompli
from the perspective of the stockholder vote. Thus, there was both little practical value
in a disclosure-based injunction and too little time to make the close call of whether the
marginal disclosure claims presented justified an injunction. . . . [a]s discussed below,
these circumstances were unique and do not provide a sufficient basis to expand the
doctrine of quasi-appraisal.”).
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what would have happened if disclosure had been made) and damage or
quasi-appraisal calculation.”125 Thus, both cases are noteworthy for their
expansion of the quasi-appraisal remedy in post-closing proceedings
where the plaintiffs would not suffer significant “irreparable harm”126 or
“irreparable injury.”127 However, they provide limited additional
protections or remedies for shareholders based on unique situations where
time pressures forced the Court of Chancery to expedite proceedings and
avoid deciding on impractical merger injunctions.
While not a quasi-appraisal decision, Glassman v. Unocal
Exploration Corporation established quasi-appraisal as an appropriate
remedy for duty of disclosure violations following short-form mergers.
As noted previously,128 Glassman determined that absent fraud or
illegality and subject to full disclosure, appraisal is the exclusive remedy
for shareholders dissenting from a short-form cash-out merger in
Delaware.129 Therefore, Glassman eliminated the need for the controlling
shareholder to establish entire fairness in favor of “a simple, fast and
inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger” that the Delaware
Supreme Court considered to be consistent with “the truncated process
authorized by § 253.”130 Yet, because closing would occur at the time of
the short-form merger, the decision paved the way for quasi-appraisal as
a post-closing remedy for violations of a parent corporation’s duty of
disclosure.131 It remains to be seen how quasi-appraisal proceedings
125. Steiner, 1991 WL 40872, at *3.
126. Ocean Drilling, 1991 WL 70028, at *7.
127. Steiner, 1991 WL 40872, at *2.
128. See supra Part I.B.
129. Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001).
130. Id. at 247–48.
131. See, e.g., Geis, supra note 118, at 1648 (emphasizing that quasi-appraisal
emerged as a judicial response to problems created by the combination of DGCL Section
253 and the new Glassman standard of review). While some have noted that this decision
benefited minority shareholders, others have warned of the potential for further
manipulation of minority shareholders by the majority. Compare, Stanley Onyeador,
Note, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs Expose Need to Further
Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339, 343 (2017) (footnote
omitted) (“Target shareholders in short-form mergers retain appraisal as an absolute
remedy because such transactions substitute procedural rigor for efficiency, justifying
value insurance of minority shares for which the market does not always provide an
accurate valuation.”), with Geis, supra note 118, at 1644 (footnotes omitted) (“While
freezeout mergers can promote efficient and desirable outcomes, they also forge a
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should be structured when a parent corporation violates its duty of full
disclosure following a short-form merger.132
B. QUASI-APPRAISAL: TO REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TOOPT-INOR OUT?
In a notable pre-Glassman opinion, quasi-appraisal was invoked as
an equitable remedy to alleviate a violation of DGCL Section 262 on an
opt-out basis. In Nebel v. Southwest Bancorp, Inc.,133 the Court of
Chancery allowed a minority shareholder who had not sought appraisal
to challenge a short-form merger on the grounds that the defendant
corporation, which owned 91.68% of the target’s shares prior to the
DGCL Section 253 merger, failed to provide a proper copy of the
appraisal statute.134 The court found this to be a material misdisclosure
and a statutory violation and while stopping short of allowing rescissory
damages or invalidating the merger, the court determined quasi-appraisal
was the appropriate remedy for the minority shareholders.135 In a parallel
appraisal proceeding conducted on an opt-out basis, the court determined
that plaintiffs were entitled to the difference between the merger
consideration received and the fair value of their shares, an increase from
$41 to $85 per share.136 This provided a significant recovery for the
plaintiffs and a formal recognition of the harms that minority plaintiffs
could suffer from flawed disclosure and improper appraisal calculations.
powerful weapon for majority shareholders interested in taking advantage of minority
owners.”).
132. See In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 49–50 (Del. Ch.
2014) (discussing Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248).
133. Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp, Inc., Civ. A. No. 13618, 1995 WL 405750, (Del. Ch. July
5, 1995).
134. Id. at *1, *6–7, (stating that although the corporation notified the stockholders
of the record date and availability of shares for appraisal, the corporation had violated
DGCL Section 262(d)(1) because the last page of the Delaware appraisal statute attached
to the notice was in fact a statute from another state).
135. Id.; see also Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp Inc., No. Civ. A. 13618, 1999 WL 135259,
at *8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 1999) (discussing previous ruling and ruling on motions to dismiss
claims presented in the second amended complaint).
136. Nebel v. Sw. Bancorp Inc., 1999WL 135259, at *8. This increase likely reflected
a flawed appraisal proceeding which determined the “fair market value” of the minority
shares rather than the value of the company as a going concern and the pro-rata
percentage owned by the minority shareholders. Id. at *2 n.3.
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Nearly ten years later, in a post-Glassman opinion, the Court of
Chancery invoked quasi-appraisal inGilliland v. Motorola, Inc. on an opt-
in basis.137 In Gilliland, Motorola, Inc. (Motorola) failed to provide
financial information in a short-form merger notice sent to the minority
shareholders of Next Level Communications (Next Level), following
Motorola’s acquisition of Next Level’s shares.138 However, Motorola
conducted a first-step tender offer and argued that it met its full duty of
disclosure because the “total mix” of recently published financial
information, including financial information of Next Level provided
during its first-step tender offer, was sufficient so that no additional
financial information was necessary in the short-form merger notice.139
Vice Chancellor Lamb rejected this argument and ruled that a parent
corporation must completely disclose all material facts relevant to the
minority stockholders’ decisions whether to accept the merger
consideration or to seek appraisal, including substantive financial
information relating to the value of the target company, in the short-form
merger notice provided.140 However, Vice Chancellor Lamb crafted the
quasi-appraisal remedy on an opt-in basis for minority shareholders and
required the plaintiffs to place $0.14 per share of their merger
consideration into escrow to join the class action seeking appraisal.141 In
doing so, Vice Chancellor Lamb distinguished the disclosure violations
of Nebel and stated that the plaintiffs’ opt-out “solution distorts the
traditional risk/reward tradeoff found in a statutory appraisal and puts
Motorola in an inequitable position not justified by the facts in this
case.”142 Gilliland, thus, provides further clarification as to the duty of
disclosure requirements of controlling shareholders in short-form
mergers, but left questions remaining as to when quasi-appraisal should
mirrorGilliland orNebel, and again how closely a quasi-appraisal remedy
should mirror the mandated requirements of DGCL Section 262.
137. Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc., 873 A.2d 305, 313 (Del. Ch. 2005).
138. Id. at 307–08 (explaining howMotorola had initially acquired 88% of Next Level
Communications in a first step tender-offer ending on April 2003, and then converted a
portion of its preferred stock to common stock prior to completing a short-form merger
pursuant to DGCL Section 253).
139. Id. (noting how Motorola had met the other statutory requirements of DGCL
Section 262).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 313–14.
142. Id. at 315.
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The Delaware Supreme Court addresses these issues en banc in
Berger v. Pubco Corp. when it tailored a Nebel style quasi-appraisal
remedy and stated that “the quasi-appraisal remedy for a violation of th[e]
fiduciary disclosure obligation[]should not be restricted by opt in or
escrow requirements.”143 Berger involved a “going private” transaction in
which Pubco’s president, Robert H. Kanner, owned over 90% of Pubco’s
shares and cashed out its minority shareholders for $20 per share.144 The
Court of Chancery ruled that Kanner committed two separate disclosure
violations by: (1) attaching the wrong appraisal statute and (2) not
discussing the method used to determine the $20 consideration offered,145
and ordered Kanner to provide supplemental disclosures while ordering a
Gilliland style quasi-appraisal remedy.146 Affirming the separate
disclosure violations, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that the
“practicality of implementation and fairness to the litigants” warranted
reversal of the Court of Chancery’s decision to apply opt-in and escrow
requirements for quasi-appraisal.147 Furthermore, the court stated that
“majority stockholders that deprive their minority shareholders of
material information should forfeit their statutory right to retain the
merger proceeds payable to shareholders who, if fully informed, would
have elected appraisal,”148 and did not require those seeking quasi-
appraisal to make a demand through their record holders at the time of the
merger.149
Berger v. Pubco is particularly noteworthy for the way in which the
Delaware Supreme Court justified its remedy. The court specified that
quasi-appraisal need not directly replicate DGCL Section 262 statutory
protections, and could be adjusted to resemble a statutory appraisal with
variations to account for a balancing of the equities.150 Nevertheless, the
court went so far as to say that “where there is a breach of the duty of
143. Berger v. Pubco Corp., 976 A.2d 132, 145 (Del. 2009).
144. Id. at 134.
145. Id. at 135–36 (discussing Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civil Action No. 3414–CC,
2008 WL 2224107, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2008)).
146. Berger v. Pubco Corp., Civil Action No. 3414–CC, 2008 WL 2224107, at *5
(Del. Ch. May 30, 2008) (requiring both an opt-in and escrow requirement), rev’d, 976
A.2d 132 (Del. 2009).
147. Berger, 976 A.2d at 136, 140.
148. Id. at 144.
149. Id. at 141.
150. Id. at 142 n.27, 145.
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disclosure in a short form merger, the Gilliland approach does not
appropriately balance the equities.”151 The court justified this statement
by noting that because the opt-out requirement would be more beneficial
to minority shareholders by avoiding the risk of forfeiture, and neither the
opt-out nor opt-in requirement would be more burdensome to the majority
shareholder,152 that an opt-in requirement was the proper remedy.153
Further, while not requiring minority shareholders to escrow a portion of
their consideration might confer the “dual benefit” of retaining the merger
proceeds while pursuing a class action, that “[t]he appraisal statute should
be construed even-handedly” and the majority shareholder should be held
accountable for violations of DGCL Section 253.154 A significant
progression from the humble origins of quasi-appraisal, Berger
emphasized that majority shareholders would be deprived of the benefits
of DGCL Section 253 if they materially violated the duty of disclosure in
short-form mergers.
C. A REMEDY OR ACAUSE OFACTION?
While Berger v. Pubco signaled the potential for an increased risk of
litigation following short-form mergers, quasi-appraisal relief remains a
rarely invoked equitable remedy. In fact, Delaware courts emphasized
that “quasi-appraisal is not itself a cause of action, but is instead a remedy
that, where appropriate, awards stockholders damages based on the
going-concern value of their previously owned stock upon a finding of a
breach of fiduciary duty, such as the duty to disclose.”155 Post-Berger
opinions provide further elucidations of additional issues that can evade
quasi-appraisal proceedings. For instance, in Houseman v. Sagerman, the
Court of Chancery denied a quasi-appraisal remedy based on the doctrine
of laches—which prevents the enforcement of delayed legal claims if they
151. Id. at 145.
152. Id. at 143 (noting that the majority shareholders would easily know the members
of the plaintiff class at an early stage regardless of an opt-in or opt-out requirement).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 144. Although the court crafted a Nebel style quasi-appraisal remedy, it
recognized that a Gilliland style quasi-appraisal remedy may still be appropriate in cases
involving a “technical and non-prejudicial violation” of DGCL Section 253. Id. at 145.
155. Houseman v. Sagerman, C.A. No. 8897–VCG, 2015 WL 7307323, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 19, 2015) (citing In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 42
(Del. Ch. 2014)).
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prejudice defendants—and the difficulty of producing information to craft
a quasi-appraisal remedy after ruling that the plaintiffs would otherwise
be entitled to one.156 These additional concerns further emphasize the
limited opportunity for minority shareholders to avail themselves of the
quasi-appraisal remedy. While originally interpreted as a landmark
plaintiff-friendly opinion with the potential to change appraisal law,
Berger likely did not open the floodgates of quasi-appraisal and merely
serves as a reminder of the importance of proper disclosure in DGCL
Section 253 mergers.
Furthermore, the standard for a breach of the duty of disclosure
remains a significant hurdle for plaintiffs to avail themselves of the quasi-
appraisal remedy. This is magnified by the increased scrutiny Delaware
courts place over post-closing disclosure claims. Recently, Nguyen v.
Barrett,157 which involved an alleged omission of information related to
unlevered free cash flows and the compensation contingency for a
financial advisor who advised the acquiring company prior to a DGCL
Section 251(h) merger, reaffirmed the narrowing opportunity for
plaintiffs to challenge mergers.158 In Nguyen, the plaintiffs added a
“count” of quasi-appraisal to their second amended complaint following
a merger pursuant to DGCL Section 251.159 The court found that “a
disclosure that does not include all financial data to make an independent
determination of fair value is not . . . per se misleading or omitting a
material fact” and would not rise to the level of a material omission which
could result in a quasi-appraisal remedy.160 Since plaintiffs must prove “at
trial that the defendants committed a non-exculpated breach of the
fiduciary duty of disclosure, then damages can be awarded using a quasi-
156. Id. at *10–12.
157. Nguyen v. Barrett, C.A. No. 11511–VCG, 2016WL 5404095 (Del. Ch. Sept. 28,
2016).
158. See, e.g., Warren S. de Wied, Narrow Path for Success of Post-Closing
Disclosure Claims–Nguyen v. Barrett, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE& FIN.
REG. (Nov. 2, 2016), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/11/02/narrow-path-for-succe
ss-of-post-closing-disclosure-claims-nguyen-v-barrett/ [https://perma.cc/27YX-L448]
(noting the difficulty plaintiffs face in bringing disclosure claims post-closing and the
narrowing window to challenge merger transactions post-closing).
159. Nguyen, 2016 WL 5404095, at *2.
160. Nguyen v. Barrett, Civil Action No. 11511–VCG, 2015WL 5882709, at *4 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 8, 2015) (quoting In re CheckFree Corp. S’holders Litig., Civil Action No.
31393–CC, 2007 WL 3262188, at *2 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2007)), appeal denied, 2015 WL
5924668, at *1 (Del. Oct. 9, 2015).
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appraisal measure,”161 the standard remains significantly burdensome for
minority shareholders to present post-closing damages claims following
DGCL Section 253 mergers.
The burdensome standard for post-closing damages claims following
DGCL Section 253 mergers is apparent in the Court of Chancery’s recent
denial of a minority shareholder’s request for quasi-appraisal in In re
United Capital Corp. Stockholders Litigation.162 In re United Capital
involved a DGCL Section 253 “going private” transaction by a
controlling shareholder who appointed an independent special committee
that set the merger price at $32, and provided recent financial statements,
management’s analysis of the financial statements, background
information on the merger, and disclosures about potential board
conflicts.163 The plaintiff challenged the merger on the grounds that the
merger notice omitted information about the company’s reasoning for the
merger price, financial valuation protections, the process undertaken by
the special committee, and potential conflicts involving the directors.164
The merger price was noteworthy because it was $7 below the share price
on the announcement date and was determined without the use of
financial advisors.165 However, the court dismissed the action because the
plaintiff failed to plead that the disclosures were inadequate, and further
denied quasi-appraisal on the grounds that “none of [p]laintiff’s alleged
omissions [we]re material to the decision of whether to seek appraisal in
light of the abundant disclosures already provided.”166 Further, the court
found that the plaintiff had enough information to determine that he might
not be able to “trust the merger price” and therefore “stockholders ha[d]
all the information necessary to decide whether to seek appraisal.”167 The
case is noteworthy in emphasizing the difficulty for plaintiffs pleading
duty of disclosure violations and the rarity of quasi-appraisal equitable
relief. While the court noted that the shareholders had enough information
161. Chen v. Howard-Anderson, 87 A.3d 648, 691 (Del. Ch. 2014).
162. In re United Capital Corp. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 11619–VCMR, 2017
WL 389520 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 2017).
163. Id. at *2.
164. Id. at *1.
165. Id. at *2 (noting that the controlling shareholder had originally announced a
merger price of $30 per share, but negotiated with the independent special committee and
raised the consideration to $32 per share).
166. Id. at *4.
167. Id. at *8.
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to distrust the merger price, the case emphasizes that the controlling
shareholder need not provide enough information for an independent
assessment of the value of the minority shares.168
Creative pleadings that avoid characterizing quasi-appraisal claims
as breaches of the fiduciary duty of disclosure face similar challenges in
surpassing the pleading stage. Oftentimes these claims have the
significant burden of overcoming the threshold exculpatory provision of
DGCL Section 102(b)(7) which exculpates director’s monetary liability
for breaches of the duty of care.169 For instance, in In Re Cyan, Inc.
Stockholders Litigation, plaintiffs brought post-closing claims alleging
that Cyan’s board breached its fiduciary duties by making material
omissions and misstatements in proxy materials that were issued prior to
being acquired by Ciena Corporation in a mostly stock-for-stock
transaction,170 and sought quasi-appraisal as an independent claim.171 The
plaintiffs argued that their “equitable claim [wa]s for frustration of the
statutory right of appraisal, not breach of fiduciary duty” and that because
appraisal is statutory, that a failure to provide information sufficient to
decide whether to seek appraisal should be evaluated independently from
breach of fiduciary duty claims.172 The plaintiffs also argued that Cyan
168. The court noted that “in a short-form merger, the minority stockholders are not
entitled to all facts material to their own valuation assessment.” Id. at *7, (citing Berger
v. Pubco Corp., Civil Action No. 3414–CC, 2008 WL 2224107, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 30,
2008)).
169. DGCL Section 102(b)(7) provides in part that a Delaware certificate of
incorporation may contain a “provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a
director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate or limit the
liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation
or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law.” DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (West
2015).
170. Notably, the plaintiffs alleged that: (1) the board materially misled its
shareholders regarding financial advisor Jefferies LLC’s potential conflict in providing
advice on the transaction as an owner of $5.5 million of Cyan’s 8% convertible notes; (2)
the board failed to disclose the significance of revenues from its largest customer,
Windstream; (3) the board failed to disclose Jefferies LLC’s precedent transaction that
appeared in the appendix of a PowerPoint presentation Jefferies provided to the board. In
re Cyan, Inc. Stockholders Litig., C.A. No. 11027–CB, 2017 WL 1956955, at *12–16
(May 11, 2017).
171. Id. at *1.
172. Id. at *17.
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acted in bad faith by not providing a supplement to the proxy materials
after receiving a letter from plaintiffs’ counsel seeking further
information to help determine whether to seek appraisal.173 Citing
Corwin’s safe harbor for fully informed, uncoerced votes by a majority of
disinterested shareholders, and stating that the plaintiffs failed to plead a
non-exculpated breach of fiduciary duty, the court dismissed the breach
of fiduciary claims on two independent grounds.174 Furthermore, the court
denied the plaintiffs’ request for quasi-appraisal and reinforced the
holding from In re Orchard Enterprises, Inc. Stockholder Litigation that
quasi-appraisal is “simply a form of remedy” and not an independent
cause of action that could be assessed separately from the duty of
disclosure claims to circumvent DGCL Section 102(b)(7) and Corwin.175
While quasi-appraisal is clearly permitted as a form of remedy and not as
a cause of action, In re Cyan emphasizes both the difficulty that plaintiffs
face in determining whether to seek appraisal and the limited recourse
available when challenging disclosure or seeking equitable relief post-
closing.
IV. PROPOSALS FORREFORM
In re United Capital Corp. and current trends in merger litigation—
that limit plaintiff’s abilities to recover post-closing damages and provide
greater deference to controlling shareholders—reflect the significant
burdens minority shareholders face in recovering for alleged violations of
a controlling shareholder’s duty of disclosure. Furthermore, as some
commentators note, appraisal is an ineffective mechanism of deterring
opportunistic majority shareholder behavior that takes advantage of
minority shareholders.176 This problem is magnified in the context of
short-form mergers under DGCL Section 253 because of the difficulties
minority shareholders face in assessing the value of their shares, and the
173. Id. at *11.
174. Id.
175. Id. at *17.
176. See, e.g., Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal
Litigation, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 331 n.196 (2017), (noting that “a basic problem with
appraisal as a mechanism of deterrence is that there is a natural limit to the number of
shares that can dissent. In a long-form merger or a tender offer, realistically not more
than 50% could conceivably demand appraisal, and in a short-form merger not more than
10% could dissent”).
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likelihood of under-enforcement of opportunistic manipulation by a
controlling shareholder.177 Under DGCL Section 253, short-form mergers
are deemed effective before any disclosure is made to minority
shareholders and thus must exist in the post-Trulia and Corwin world
where controlling shareholders limit discovery pre-closing and post-
closing claims are subjected to heightened scrutiny.178
While appraisal arbitrage is a problematic phenomenon, it is likely
addressed with the most recent amendments to DGCL Section 262 and
the SWS, Clearwire, and DFC Global decisions.179 For that reason,
controlling shareholders can bet on the fact that significantly less than ten
percent of the minority shareholders will seek appraisal. Therefore, they
are incentivized to offer less of a merger price as the controlling
shareholder did in In re United Capital Corp.180 Due to the vague nature
of the current materiality standard, shareholders are often forced to decide
whether to seek appraisal with limited independent ability to value their
shares. Furthermore, controlling shareholders have an incentive to
disclose information that portrays the merger price offered in the way
177. Chief Justice Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that minority
shareholders can be inherently disadvantaged by information asymmetries, timing
disadvantages, and the potential for coercion and unfairness by controlling shareholders
when making decisions to tender or seek appraisal. See In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders
Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 450 (Del. Ch. 2002).
178. See supra Parts II.A.–B.
179. See Jack B. Jacobs, Pushbacks and Delaware Appraisal Arbitrage, HARV. L.
SCH. F.ONCORP. GOVERNANCE&FIN. REG. (June 28, 2016) https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/2016/06/28/pushbacks-and-delaware-appraisal-arbitrage/ [https://perma.cc/626Q-P
4XJ] (noting how the de minimis exception and implications from Dell that the surviving
corporation will be able to ascertain whether a purchased block of shares voted in favor
of the merger will decrease the risk for appraisal arbitrage and lessen appraisal claims
filed).
180. See Jay B. Kesten, The Uncertain Case for Appraisal Arbitrage, 52 WAKE
FOREST L. REV 89, 129 (2017) (noting that “in most cases it is likely rational and cost
effective to offer a lower price to the majority or at least not raise one’s bid and set aside
an ‘appraisal reserve’ for any potential dissenters”) (citation omitted); contra Brian
Broughman et al., Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal 19 (Sept. 27,
2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3
039040 [https://perma.cc/54DN-J56P] (finding that “[b]idders acquiring a Delaware
target do not appear to lower their price in response to events that increase the threat of
appraisal”).
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most advantageous to them.181 This is particularly noticeable when the
merger price deal premium is significantly less than average.182 The In re
United Capital Corp. case thus serves as an example of an instance where
quasi-appraisal should be expanded to ensure that controlling
shareholders adhere to their duty of disclosure and do not unfairly
disadvantage minority shareholders.
This Part proposes several potential adjustments to the quasi-
appraisal remedy, and discusses the implications of (1) recognizing quasi-
appraisal as a cause of action after altering disclosure requirements to
ensure that quasi-appraisal need only to be invoked in the most egregious
forms of duty of disclosure violations, (2) mandating that quasi-appraisal
actions be conducted on an opt-out basis, and (3) adding punitive damages
to quasi-appraisal actions to deter controlling shareholder opportunism.
A. REASSESSINGQUASI-APPRAISAL AS AN INDEPENDENTCAUSE OF
ACTION
Recognizing quasi-appraisal damages as an independent post-
closing cause of action in DGCL Section 253 mergers would have a
significant effect on plaintiffs’ abilities to recover from controlling
shareholders’ violations of their duty of disclosure. Not only would
controlling shareholders be required to provide the DGCL Section 262
mandated information to minority shareholders, they would also need to
ensure that all provided information permits shareholders to properly
consider the alternatives of seeking appraisal for their shares. In this way,
the disclosure requirement could be strengthened to require that
stockholders “be given all the financial data they would need if they were
181. See In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., C.A. No. 8703–VCL, 2015 WL
5052214, at *1–2, *29–32 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 2015) (discussing management earnings
manipulation prior to a management buyout and finding that management intentionally
undermined projections made in disclosure materials).
182. See US M&A News and Trends, FACTSET (July 2017), https://www.factset.com/
mergerstat_em/monthly/US_Flashwire_Monthly.pdf [https://perma.cc/D63W-XZ3W]
(reporting a median deal premium between 24% and 50% between the second quarters
of 2015 and 2017); see also Broughman et al., supra note 180 (manuscript at 2) (finding
that “shareholders of Delaware targets receive marginally higher acquisition premiums
following events that strengthen the appraisal remedy”).
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making an independent determination of fair value.”183 Additional
disclosure would be easy to provide and would ensure that minority
shareholders had an ability to independently determine the value of their
shares and decide whether to seek appraisal.184
In instances where minority shareholders opted not to seek appraisal
and suffered “irreparable harm” from controlling shareholder
misrepresentations or omissions, they would have a cause of action which
would ensure sufficient discovery and disclosure after the pleadings stage.
Since plaintiffs who could plead with particularity that they had suffered
“irreparable harm” would avail themselves of an approximation of an
appraisal proceeding at earlier stages of litigation, they could avoid
discovery restraints and early dismissal of meritorious claims that
affected their decision whether to seek appraisal. Although this would
likely increase the incentive for disclosure-only settlements, heightened
judicial scrutiny in the post-Trulia world would ensure that only those
supplemental disclosures that remedied previously material omissions or
misrepresentations would be appropriate. Thus, these supplemental
disclosures would likely qualify as “plainly material” for purposes of the
Trulia standard. With these additions, quasi-appraisal would rarely need
to be invoked and would only be appropriate in the most egregious duty
of disclosure violations. Furthermore, Delaware would be able to limit
informational asymmetries and the potential for coercive or opportunistic
behavior by controlling shareholders in DGCL Section 253 mergers.
B. MANDATING THATQUASI-APPRAISAL BECONDUCTED ON ANOPT-OUT
BASIS
Quasi-appraisal is traditionally invoked as a remedy when a fiduciary
breaches its duty of disclosure in a transaction which involves a vote, not
one that is statutorily available to expedite proceedings.185 Although it is
183. See Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000) (expressly
rejecting the expanded disclosure standard because it was not sufficient for the plaintiffs
to “merely allege that the added information would be helpful in valuing the company”).
184. See Korsmo & Myers, supra note 176, at 336–38 (discussing the standard
rejected in Skeen as the appropriate disclosure standard to ensure proper disclosure which
would be easily facilitated by corporations and would benefit the private enforcement
system of duty of disclosure violations).
185. See, e.g., In re Orchard Enters., Inc. Stockholder Litig., 88 A.3d 1, 42 (Del. Ch.
2014) (“One cause of action where the Delaware Supreme Court and the Court of
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invoked frequently in the DGCL Section 253 short-form merger context,
it is applied with limited uniformity. Therefore, in DGCL Section 253
proceedings where minority shareholders are denied the protection of a
vote, they should be entitled to opt-out class-certification and lesser
demand requirements for quasi-appraisal damages when a controlling
shareholder breaches its duty of disclosure. These adjustments would be
in line with the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Berger v. Pubco
Corp., and would reflect that minority shareholders should have the
opportunity to be compensated for the loss of their equity as a going
concern. These remedies would mirror those available after a long-form
merger (which similarly do not require an opt-in or an escrow requirement
to challenge transactions) and would ensure that plaintiffs recover from
controlling shareholders’ most egregious duty of disclosure violations.
C. MAKINGQUASI-APPRAISAL REMEDIES PUNITIVE
The current use of quasi-appraisal inadequately protects minority
shareholders in DGCL Section 253 mergers. This is because a violation
of a controlling shareholder’s duty of disclosure that results in
“irreparable harm” resembles compensatory damages with no deterrent
effect. While Gilliland v. Motorola, Inc. sought to equate opt-out, no
escrow requirement, quasi-appraisal remedies with a procedural windfall
to the plaintiffs, the rarity of quasi-appraisal should guarantee that when
minority shareholders are “irreparably harmed,” controlling shareholders
are held accountable for violating their duty of disclosure. As In re Dole
Food Co. serves as a cautionary tale for management manipulation of
minority shareholders in a management buyout, its deterrent effect could
be strengthened via the availability of a multiplied factor of damages akin
to treble damages in the antitrust context. This damage multiple might
only be available in cases like Berger v. Pubco Corp. where minority
shareholders are blatantly deprived of the ability to determine the value
of their shares and there exists a clear violation of the statutorily mandated
Chancery consistently have held that quasi-appraisal damages are available is when a
fiduciary breaches its duty of disclosure in connection with a transaction that requires a
stockholder vote. The premise for the award is that without the disclosure of false or
misleading information, or the failure to disclose material information, stockholders
could have voted down the transaction and retained their proportionate share of the equity
in the corporation as a going concern. Quasi-appraisal damages serve as a monetary
substitute for the proportionate share of the equity that the stockholders otherwise would
have retained.”).
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requirements under DGCL Section 262. This would ensure that the
private enforcement system for violations of the duty of disclosure
properly addresses instances where controlling shareholders made
material misrepresentations or omissions that significantly impacted
minority shareholders’ decisions regarding appraisal.
CONCLUSION
This Note analyzes how recent amendments to the DGCL and
current trends in merger and appraisal litigation present an apt opportunity
to expand the role of quasi-appraisal as an equitable remedy following
DGCL Section 253 mergers in Delaware. Because of the challenges
associated with minority ownership of corporations and potential abuse
by controlling shareholders, this piece addresses making quasi-appraisal
an independent cause of action, expanding disclosure requirements to
ensure that minority shareholders can conduct independent valuations of
their shares, mandating that quasi-appraisal remedies be available on an
opt-out basis, and making egregious violations of the duty of disclosure
subject to punitive damages. While these proposals are by no means an
exhaustive effort to reform appraisal litigation, they provide a baseline to
ensure proper disclosure and to deter controlling shareholder misconduct
of DGCL Section 253. Minority shareholders who are “cashed out”
should have the opportunity to independently assess the value of their
shares prior to deciding whether to seek appraisal and should be entitled
to appropriate damages if a controlling shareholder violates its duty of
disclosure. For that reason, these efforts seek to guarantee that quasi-
appraisal be invoked to ensure that minority shareholders are “cashed out”
in the most fair and practical way possible.
